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DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE IN TRANSITION
Marion Smiley*

By Ian Shapiro. New Haven: Yale University
Press. 1999. Pp. xiii, 333. $29.95.
DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE.

By Ruti G.
University Press. 2000. Pp. ix, 292. $35.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE.

Teitel.

New York: Oxford

Ruti Teitel's 1 Transitional Justice and Ian Shapiro's2 Democratic
come out of very different academic traditions. But they both
develop a view of justice that might loosely be called pragmatic by vir
tue of its treatment of justice as a value that is simultaneously
grounded in practice and powerful in bringing about social and politi
cal change. Moreover, they both use this shared pragmatic view of jus
tice to provide us with two things that are of great importance to the
study of transitional justice and democracy in general. The first is an
explanatory framework for understanding how legal institutions and
claims about justice function during periods of transition from authori
tarianism to democracy. The second is a normative framework for
generating principles of justice that can be used to democratize prac
tices in all spheres of life: personal, social, economic, and political.
Teitel and Shapiro's general view of justice is very compelling on
its own terms and particularly well suited to the efforts of those who
want to think about justice practically without degrading it or treating
it as merely superstructural. The pragmatic view of justice they de
velop does not, like its transcendental counterparts, force us to locate
a universal moral principle called justice. Nor does it, like its more
cynical realist counterparts, force us to accept the status quo or to re
sign ourselves to a world where justice is considered to be no more
than a mere mask for power politics and economic interest. Instead, it
allows us to treat our moral and legal values, including justice, as both
historically situated constructs and powerful tools for bringing about
social and political change.
While the pragmatic view of justice that Teitel and Shapiro de
velop is potentially more realistic and more useful than its transcen
dental and Marxist counterparts, it is not all that easy to substantiate
Justice

* Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison. - Ed.
1. Professor of Comparative Law, New Yor k Law School.
2. Professor of Political Science, Yale University.

1332

May 2001]

Democratic Justice in Transition

1333

in particular cases. Indeed, 1t is very difficult to substantiate in par
ticular cases, since it requires us to view particular notions of justice as
grounded in particular social and political practices and to show how
these notions shape, maintain, and change the particular communities
of which they are a part. Not surprisingly, very few of those legal and
political theorists who now call themselves pragmatists actually get
around to the required level of historical interpretation and empirical
analysis, and those who do tend to focus on values that are obviously
institutional in nature, such as property, rather than on those values
such as justice that, while in dire need of contextualization, appear too
far removed from practice to be grasped as anything other than uni
versal truths.3
Indeed, outside of John Rawls' recent avowal of pragmatism in his
revised theory of justice,4 very few of those now writing on justice at
tempt to understand justice as both grounded in, and powerful over,
social and political practice. Instead, they generally fall back on either
an idealist notion of justice, according to which justice is above, albeit
applicable to, politics, or a realist notion of justice, according to which
justice is so steeped in politics that it has. no power to shape, maintain
or change social and political institutions. In other words, they gener
ally fall back on the very realist/idealist divide that Dewey and other
pragmatists spent so much effort on putting to rest.
Both the realist and the idealist notions of justice have, admittedly,
the advantages of simplicity in most of their many guises - advan
tages that pragmatists can only envy from afar, since their own analy
ses are necessarily messy. But neither of these two notions of justice is
as attractive as its adherents suggest that it is. The realistic notion of
justice - or at least that which treats justice as politics - appears to
be empirically sound. But it is too flat in its determinism to grasp the
various ways in which justice as an ideal exerts power over the social
and political practices of which it is a part. Hence, while it manages to
avoid the traps of idealism, it does not in the end live up to the very
standards of realism that its advocates rightly place at the center of our
attention.
The idealist notion of justiCe is, in its most abstract formulation,
coherent. But it cannot as so formulated help us to figure out what jus
tice looks like in particular contexts. Nor can it show us how to bal
ance justice claims with the practical constraints of institutional life.
For, to do so, it would have to incorporate into itself both the details
of particular spheres of life and the rules according to which particular
social and political institutions are now governed. In other words, it
would have to allow itself to be determined, if only in part, by the very
3. See, e.g., MARGARET RADIN, REINTERP RETING PROPERTY (1993).
4. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL L IBERALISM (1996).
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contingencies of social and political practice that it is supposed to be
free of as a transcendental value.
Interestingly enough, those idealist notions of justice that now ap
pear to have a great deal of substance do so because those who ar
ticulate them assume as givens a variety of historically and culturally
particular institutions and practices. Rawls himself acknowledges the
dependence of his own principles of justice on the historically and cul
turally particular practices of Western democracy: liberal individual
ism, market economics and secularism. But he does not provide con
crete connections between his two principles of justice, on the one
hand, and these particular practices, on the other. Nor does he tell us
how they operate together. Hence, in the end, he confronts the same
dilemmas of application that other idealists face in their efforts to de
velop normative theories of justice that are practical.
All of this suggests that both the purely idealistic and the purely
realist notions of justice have serious drawbacks. The purely idealist
notion cannot be translated into practice without smuggling histori
cally and culturally particular norms and institutions into itself. These
norms and institutions call out for justification and undermine the
transcendental and universal identity of justice itself. The purely real
ist notion, on the other hand, cannot cope with the fact that justice is
itself a governing practice that has power over the very institutions of
which it is a part. Nor can it make sense of practical ideals in general.
Not surprisingly, these drawbacks become particularly obvious,
and troublesome, in cases of transitional justice - for example, in
cases where a particular regime· is trying to move from authoritarian
ism to democracy, or in cases where efforts are being made to correct
injustices within existing institutions. In these cases, justice cannot
possibly be viewed as transcendental or universal, since it is, at least in
its worldly guises, constantly in flux. Nor can it be viewed as a mere
reflection of the status quo or of prevailing power relations, since it is
frequently a powerful ideal in altering prevailing power relations and
in democratizing institutions and practices that were in the past un
democratic.
In these cases, we would appear to be in need of a notion of justice
that not only bridges the idealism/realism divide, but that treats justice
in the following ways: first, as part of institutional life, rather than as
an ideal imposed from above; second, as infused with the practicalities
of institutional life, rather than as tainted by them; third, as manifested
differently at various stages of history and within distinct social and
political institutions; and fourth, as a powerful tool for bringing about
social and political change. In other words, we would appear to be in
need of a notion of justice that views justice realistically while pre
serving its standing as a powerful ideal - a notion of justice we might
call pragmatic.
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How might we articulate such a notion of justice? How might we
use it to explain and to argue normatively about justice in transitional
regimes and in cases where we wish to move beyond the status quo
within existing institutions? Ruti Teitel and Ian Shapiro provide us
with intelligent, creative, and compelling answers to these questions,
first by developing a notion of justice that is both realistic and norma
tively powerful, and then by using this notion of justice within their
own richly detailed studies. Teitel focuses on the nature and functions
of transitional justice in various democratizing regimes of Eastern
Europe, Africa, and Latin America. Shapiro develops a principle of
democratic justice that is both grounded in various spheres of life,
both public and private, and powerful in rendering these spheres of
life more democratic than they are now.
I.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN PRACTICE

Teitel begins Transitional Justice by making clear that in cases of
transitional justice, like in cases of "ordinary" justice, law does not de
termine politics. Nor does politics determine law. Instead, the two
shape each other within a dialectal relationship that is mutually con
structive. Hence, we cannot view law in transitional contexts as a mere
product of economic interests or political circumstances in the way
that, say, critical legal theorists do. Nor can we, like idealists, view law
as outside the boundaries of transitional politics. Instead, we have to
view law as produced by, and powerful over, both transitional politics
itself and the more particular norms ostensibly associated with it. How
can we do so? What does transitional justice look like in such a dialec
tical framework?
According to Teitel, while transitional justice shares many of the
characteristics of other legal systems, including its valuation of the rule
of law and its emphasis on regularity, it takes on special transitional
qualities by virtue of its role in structuring the normative and institu
tional transformation of a political community from one regime to an
other. Not surprisingly, many of these characteristics are analogous to
the transitional process itself. In other words, they lead us to view jus
tice in transitional contexts as in flux, partly determined by the flow of
events, straddled between different sets of norms, and effective in
bringing about social and political change.
Teitel treats her conception of transitional justice as controversial
and as a major contribution to the study of transitional regimes both
past and present:
The thesis of this book is that the conception of justice in periods of po
litical change is extraordinary and constructivist: It is alternately consti
tuted by, and constitutive of, the transition. The conception of justice
that emerges is contextualized and partial: What is deemed just is contin
gent and informed by prior injustice. [p. 6]
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Since transitional justice is always situated between at least two le
gal and political orders, it implies paradigm shifts in the conception of
justice itself and, as such, is considerably less stable and cohesive than
"ordinary" kinds of justice. According to Teitel, in "ordinary" social
contexts, law provides order, stability, and continuity. But in extraor
dinary periods of political upheaval, law provides all of these things
and acts as an agent of transformation by, among other things, devel
oping hyperpoliticized forms of adjudication and providing frame
works for discovering and airing the ugly truths of the past. In other
words, it manages to take on two functions that remain constantly in
tension with each other.
Teitel treats as a paradox the fact that justice during transitional
periods functions both to provide stability, order, and continuity, on
the one hand, and normative and institutional change on the other.
"Transitions imply paradigm shifts in the conception of justice; thus,
law's function is deeply and inherently paradoxical" (p. 6). Likewise,
she claims that such paradigm shifts render transitional justice radi
cally different from "ordinary" justice. "[I]n transition, the ordinary
intuitions and predicates about law simply do not apply" (p. 6). Hence,
she concludes that we need to develop a completely new framework
for analyzing transitional justice or, in her terms, a "paradigm of trans
formative law" (p. 6).
Teitel, in the end, probably overstates her case in claiming the exis
tence of a radical disjuncture between transitional justice and "ordi
nary" justice, since "ordinary" justice shares many of the characteris
tics that she describes here as "extraordinary." (She concedes later in
her analysis that transitional justice has "affinities to law in nontransi
tional circumstances" and that "one might think of transitional juris
prudence as exaggerated instantiations that vivify conflicts and com
promises otherwise latent in the law, and, in particular, illuminate
law's relation to politics" (p. 228).) Moreover, she confuses matters
somewhat when she talks about the tensions that are created by transi
tional justice's dual functions of stability and change as a "paradox,"
since these tensions reflect, not a disjuncture between intentions and
consequences, but rather the complicated nature of law itself.
The model of transitional justice that she develops, however, is
comprehensive, very useful, and grounded in a great deal of empirical
evidence. According to the model, all instances of transitional justice
share four general qualities. First, they situate themselves between at
least two different regimes whose normative basis is strikingly differ
ent - e.g., authoritarianism and democracy. Hence, they inevitably
embrace a mixed bag of principles. Second; they are designed not only
to create stability in transition, but also to move the community in
question from one regime (whose norms are bad) to another regime
(whose norms are good), and so to correct past injustices. As such,
they are both associated with a set of positive goals - e.g., democracy
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- and structured by the nature of the particular evils that they try to
overcome.
Third, unlike "ordinary" cases of justice, cases of transitional jus
tice do not pretend to be apolitical or uncreative. Instead, they are de
signed to realize a particular set of political goals and to lay the foun
dations of political transformation by redistributing power and wealth,
constructing new legal orders, and shaping new collective identities.
Finally, in doing all of these things, cases of transitional justice often
find it necessary to infuse legal judgments themselves with political
considerations of a very worldly - and sometimes obviously partisan
- sort.
Since transitional societies differ greatly with respect to both cul
ture and history, these four features of transitional justice take on very
different forms within particular transitional contexts, as well as in
particular spheres of legal justice: criminal, reparatory, administrative,
constitutional and "historical." Likewise, they function very differently
in particular communities and have significantly different conse
quences - both positive and negative - across particular cases. How
are they manifested in particular spheres of justice? What is their func
tion in the transitional process? What consequences follow from them
for the community in transition?
In the context of criminal law, transitional justice takes the form,
not only of punishment, but also of amnesty and clemency, in associa
tion with past crimes and acts of regime violence. It also functions to
keep order, to draw a line between regimes (in cases of punishment),
to heal wounds in the community (in cases of amnesty and clemency),
and (in all cases) to reinforce the norms and values of transition.
Moreover, it does so with an eye to the political consequences of these
measures in particular contexts. Hence, it is, as we might expe�t, less
regularized than "ordinary" criminal justice.
Since it is self-consciously practical, flexible. with respect to the
standards and criteria that it employs within particular cases, and
keenly aware of the political consequences of its judgments, criminal
justice in transitional contexts is inevitably more effective and politi
cally useful to those in power than criminal justice in many other con
texts. But it is for these same reasons open to abuse. Indeed, as Teitel
nicely demonstrates, its very flexibility and openness to politics threat
ens to undermine the legitimacy of law itself and to raise the specter of
criminal justice as a series of political show trials. How, if at all, can
such abuse of criminal justice be prevented in .transitional contexts?
In one of the most well thought out and fruitful sections of the
book, Teitel argues that many of the worst abuses that we might ex
pect of criminal justice in transitional contexts can be prevented by
using international systems of justice, which, she claims, divorce ques
tions of punishment from national politics. According to Teitel, inter
national systems of justice provide stan.dardized grounds for account-
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ability and hence greatly reduce the possibility of political show trials,
even though they might not, as Teitel suggests, eliminate the dilemmas
of successor justice altogether.5
Transitional justice is equally political and powerful, as well as
open to political abuse, in cases of reparatory law. In these cases, tran
sitional justice repairs the economic damage from earlier periods by
redistributing wealth, instituting new rights, and restoring victims' dig
nity through the legal recognition of the wrongs they suffered. Admit
tedly, the state often pursues reparatory justice in these cases for the
sake of economic development and political stability. But it also uses
reparatory justice to reconstitute the political community it represents
by giving individuals an economic stake in community membership.
Since so many of the schemes of reparatory justice instituted dur
ing transitional periods are intended to give citizens an economic stake
in the community, they tend to create a new class of property holders,
whose activities as property holders have very important consequences
for transitional politics. In some cases, members of the new class con
tribute in important ways to the development of liberal democratic in
stitutions. In other cases, they tear the community apart, prevent a
smooth transition to democracy, and reintroduce authoritarianism. In
both kinds of cases, reparatory justice grows out of the need to check
past abuses and plays an important role in the development of new
political paradigms, even though these new paradigms of politics may
not always be as liberal or as democratic as originally intended.
Not all cases of reparatory justice, of course, involve individuals or
members of classes as the focal point of attention. Indeed, some of the
most interesting cases of reparatory justice involve the state as both
the perpetrator of abuses and the provider of reparations. In many of
these cases, the issue is whether a present state should assume the
debts of its predecessor. Not surprisingly, such cases are often resolved
on the basis of economic considerations. But they also involve consid
erations about the state's identity through time and have important
consequences for identity formation among both individuals and state
actors.
As Teitel cogently argues, a state's willingness to assume the debts
of its predecessor is often a sign of intended continuity between re
gimes and, if backed up with concrete acts of reparation, can lead to
the development of an historically inclusive identity.6 Conversely, a
state's unwillingness to pay reparations to the victims of its predeces
sor regime, which occurred most obviously in post-Civil War America,
5. "Within the internat ional l egal system," she writes, "the dilemmas of succ essor justice
fal l away." P. 33.

6. This was the c ase, Teitel argues, in post -World War II Germany, although even in this
c ase the inc lusive identity c reated through reparations involved rejecting much of the older
regime.
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signals the desire of such a state not only to distance itself from the
abuses of the previous regime, but also to exclude the previous regime
from national identity - that is, to start anew with respect to national
self-consciousness.
What about administrative and constitutional law? Both kinds of
law, as it turns out, take on very peculiar - or distinctly transitional characteristics during transitional periods because of their role in tran
sitional politics, and because of the tension that develops between this
role and the more conventional stabilizing functions of law. Adminis
trative law is most strikingly different in transitional periods because
of its participation in the purges that exclude former leaders and bu
reaucrats from power. Transitional constitutional law differs most ob
viously from its "ordinary" counterparts in that it is frequently, al
though not always, designed as a set of interim measures, rather than
as a permanent fixture of the regime.
Since transitional justice in both administrative and constitutional
law is by nature more flexible, activist, and political than administra
tive and constitutional justice in "ordinary" contexts, it is potentially
more effective in bringing about social and political change and in
transforming the norms of the regime itself. But it is also potentially
more damaging to the regime, especially in cases where the norms in
question are those of liberal democracy. In these cases, the hyperpoli
tical nature of law creates a "tension of illiberal means directed to lib
eral forward-looking ends" (p. 163). As such, it threatens the process
of liberalization itself, and possibly even the meaningfulness of democ
racy as espoused by the transitional regime.
Teitel admits that such a threat is serious, and that transitional jus
tice is also found in places that appear to have lost sight of their origi
nal liberal democratic goals. But she argues that neither the threat
posed to liberalization by transitional administrative and criminal jus
tice nor the fact that transitional justice appears to exist in regimes in
the process of moving backward creates a fundamental problem for
her analysis. She explains, in a passage that is bound to be controver
sial, that transitional justice is often self-correcting and capable of
checking its own power. "Post-war purges lasted only a short while,"
she writes, and "[t]ransitional constitutions . . . transcend political ar
rangements" (pp. 163, 210).
In the end, Teitel does not include acts of backsliding in her model
of transitional justice itself. But she does present other aspects of tran
sitional justice in great detail and organizes them together into a co
herent whole that should be very useful to all those concerned about
both the legal institutions of transitional justice and transitional
movements in the particular geographical areas that she covers.
Moreover, she does so with a keen sense for the differences that exist
across regimes and through time. Hence, she manages not only to pro
vide us with a model of transitional justice that is valuable to legal
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scholars and area specialists but to contribute in important ways to the
comparative study of transitional law, both past and present.
While Teitel's model of transitional justice goes very far in articu
lating the institutional mechanisms of transitional law, it does not, as it
turns out, tell us a great deal about the ideals of justice that guide the
transitional process in particular cases. Nor does it explore the connec
tions between these ideals and the institutional mechanisms of transi
tional law that it does articulate. Instead, it takes these ideals, which
are largely liberal and democratic, for granted and focuses on transi
tional law as the subject matter of transitional justice.
Presumably, if Teitel had focused attention on the liberal and
democratic ideals of justice that she cites as manifest in the legal insti
tutions of transitional justice, she would be forced to confront a set of
very sticky questions that she does not now address, questions such as:
What if the legal institutions of transitional justice in place fail to move
us towards those goals of liberalism and democracy that we associate
with justice? Can we still talk about these institutions as just? Do we in
these cases have to distinguish between two different notions of transi
tional justice: one normative, the other legal? If so, what is the norma
tive notion of justice at work in cases of transitional justice?
Since Teitel has taken on a largely explanatory, rather than con
ceptual or normative, project, she is under no obligation to answer the
last question (although the first three questions would still seem to be
within her purview). How might a normative political theorist answer
this question? Presumably, she or he would have to take a step back
and ask: How might we bring justice and democracy (or liberalism) to
gether into a democratic (or liberal) principle of justice? How might
we ensure that such a principle is useful in bringing us closer to de
mocracy (or liberalism) in transitional contexts? What might such a
transitional principle of democratic (or liberal) justice look like?7
DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE

In Democratic Justice, Ian Shapiro provides an excellent example
of what such a principle might look like. Shapiro, like Teitel, begins
with a plea for pragmatism in formulating principles of justice in gen
eral, a plea that rejects transcendental ideals of justice and recognizes
that justice is, at all levels of abstraction, part of particular social and
political practices. But Shapiro, unlike Teitel, is a normative political
theorist. Hence, he does not set out to explain what justice looks like
in particular contexts, although he does manage to incorporate a great
deal of empirical knowledge into his arguments. Instead, he sets out to
5 . I do not think th at it is import ant to treat lib eralism and d emoc rac y as analyt ic ally
separate here, s inc e, while they might in the end be c ompat ible, they are c learly in tens ion at
points .
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develop a political - as distinct from a distributive - principle of jus
tice that will enable us to move beyond the status quo and democratize
existing social and political institutions.
Shapiro calls his principle of democratic justice a "semicontextual
ideal" to underscore that while it is both grounded in practice and
manifested differently within particular institutions, it is not merely a
reinforcement of present convention. Instead, it is a guiding principle
that, though "forged out of reactive struggles" (p. 2), is also powerful
in furthering democratic purposes by virtue of its ability to criticize the
relationships of hierarchy and domination that pervade various
spheres of public and private life. His ideal, in other words, is histori
cal in origin, meaningful only within particular contexts, never realized
perfectly, and corrective by nature - i.e. "designed to remedy evils
experienced in consequence of prior political institutions" (p. 2):
[D]emocratic justice is a semicontextual ideal. It engenders certain con
straints on and possibilities for human interaction, but these work them
selves out differently in different domains of human activity, depending
on peoples' beliefs and aspirations, the causal impact of activities in one
domain for others, the availability of resources within domains, and a va
riety of related contingent factors. [p. 5]

Shapiro makes clear that his principle of democratic justice is de
signed to straddle the extremes of realism and idealism and, in doing
so, to incorporate the best of both theoretical frameworks. "Demo
cratic justice as a semicontextual ideal mediates between the extremes
of Rawlsian idealism and Maclntyre's attachment to social practices
now in place and avoids the drawbacks of both theories" (p. 13).
What is the substance of democratic justice? What is its status in
social and political criticism? How does it help us to democratize ex
isting social and political institutions? According to Shapiro, demo
cratic justice is first and foremost a political, as distinct from an eco
nomic or a moral, concept. As such, it does not focus primarily on
distributions of wealth or on respect for moral rights, although it might
well take these two things seriously in the process of achieving justice.
Instead, it focuses largely on relationships of power - relationships
that constitute politics broadly understood by Shapiro within the
spheres of family, work, and politics.
Democratic justice is for Shapiro a matter of applying two key val
ues or aspirations of democracy to these power relationships as they
are manifest in all spheres of life in an effort to ensure that our social
and political institutions are as democratic as possible. The first of
these two values or aspirations is equality, which is most usefully un
derstood from Shapiro's perspective as equal participation in govern
ance and the absence of hierarchy and domination. The second is that
of opposition within governance. "[D]emocracy is as much about op
position to the arbitrary exercise of power as it is about collective self
government" (p. 30).
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Both values are crucial to the realization of democracy in public
and private life. But they do not exist as trumps for Shapiro in the way
that they do for many other democratic theorists. Instead, they exist as
"justice-promoting" ideals - i.e., ideals that help us to achieve other
ends in life in a democratic way. Shapiro calls the more general notion
of democracy that he associates with these ideals a "subordinate foun
dational good," rather than either the foundational good or a primary
good. And he makes clear that democracy, while very important to
justice, is not an end in itself or a substitute for justice per se:
[We need] an account of justice that accords a central place to demo
cratic ways of doing things, and a conception of democracy that can be
j ustice-promoting rather than justice-undermining. To this end, my con
tention is that we should think of democracy as a subordinate founda
tional good, designed to shape the power dimensions of collective activi
ties without subverting their legitimate purposes. [p. 18]

Democratic justice, then, governs the relationships of power that
exist between individuals in particular spheres of life according to the
principles of equality/non-domination and opposition. But it does not
determine which activities are appropriate within these spheres of life.
Nor does it have anything to say about what the legitimate purposes of
these spheres should be. Instead, it takes for granted the activities and
purposes that now exist within our various spheres of life - in much
the same way as Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice8 does - and asks
us to focus our attention on the relationships of power in which these
activities and purposes are carried out and realized.
Moreover, democratic justice insists on practical grounds that we
begin with existing practices and institutions, rather than try to invent
new ones. "The goal is to take social relations as we find them and dis
cover ways to democratize them as we reproduce them. Democratic
justice thus has a Burkean dimension, but this is tempered by the aspi
ration to create a more democratic world over time" (p. 36).
How do we apply the principle of democratic justice to existing in
stitutions? First of all, we have to focus on particular spheres of life
and discern both the particular activities and the particular purposes
associated with them, as well as the nature of the relationships of
power that exist in them and the institutions within which these rela
tionships take place. Second, we have to ask: How far can we go in
democratizing these relationships of power without undermining the
purposes of the activities associated with them? How much opposition
can we allow without destroying the spheres of life in question?
Shapiro realizes that we can never do away with all hierarchical
relationships; we can only aspire to do away with many of them. While
all hierarchical relationships are suspect - "[t]he reason being that
8. MICHAEL WALZ ER, SPH ERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
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they contain both power inequalities and truncated opportunities for
opposition" (p. 42) - not all can be eliminated without the loss of ba
sic goods. Indeed, some of these hierarchical relationships, such as the
parent-child bond, appear to be necessary to the well-being of those
who find themselves subordinated.
While such a concession might appear to backtrack on democracy,
it does not, for many of the hierarchical relationships that we now con
strue as necessary are not at all necessary, and may even be detrimen
tal to the realization of basic goods. "Too often avoidable hierarchies
masquerade as unavoidable ones, involuntary subordination is
shrouded in the language of agreement, unnecessary hierarchies are
held to be essential to the pursuit of common goals, and fixed hierar
chies are cloaked in myths about their fluidity" (p. 42).
We need to ask in particular cases: Is hierarchical relationship X,
Y, or Z necessary? Is it appropriately hierarchical? (Is it more hierar
chical than it needs to be?) Might it be redesigned so that it becomes
less hierarchical in the future? Is it a voluntary hierarchical relation
ship, or is it imposed on individuals? Can individuals opt out of it, or is
it permanent? Does it create the need for more or fewer hierarchical
relationships of other kinds? Does it create the need for more or fewer
hierarchical relationships of the same kind?
All of these questions grow out of a sense - absolutely crucial to
the principle of democratic justice - that while hierarchical relation
ships are bad in general, some are less bad than others. Presumably,
fluid and temporary hierarchies are more acceptable than ossified and
permanent ones, since the domination within these relationships is less
than it would be in its more rigid counterparts. Voluntary hierarchies
are presumably more acceptable than imposed ones, since freedom is
possible in the former, and since consent is a value in any case. Un
necessary hierarchies are presumably always out. So, too, are hierar
chical relationships that require the development of other kinds of hi
erarchical relationships or that debilitate individuals to the extent that
they cannot do without hierarchy altogether.
As it turns out, one has to know a great deal about both the par
ticular spheres of activity in question, as well as about the hierarchical
relationships in them, to figure out how to apply Shapiro's principle of
democratic justice in practice. Indeed, one has to have a firm grasp not
only of how power is wielded in each sphere, but of how the institu
tions of family, civil society, politics, and the market function sepa
rately and together in particular regimes. In this sense, Shapiro's the
ory of democratic justice imposes very stiff empirical knowledge
requirements on those who want to employ it, requirements that
Shapiro himself meets very nicely in his own application of the princi
ple to particular cases.
Shapiro's substantive arguments about democratic justice, where
he applies his principle of democratic justice to practice, are extremely
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rich in detail and complex in ways required by a theory that purports
to bring about democracy from within existing institutions. Moreover,
these arguments cover an expansive territory, including issues of
democratic justice in childhood, marriage, work, retirement and life's
end. Hence, I cannot in this space possibly treat them in any depth or
detail. Nor can I cover them all. Instead, I can only mention a few of
them to flesh out what it means according to Shapiro to democratize
power relationships within particular institutional contexts.
As we might expect, parent-child relationships pose some of the
most difficult challenges to democratic justice, since hierarchies of
some kind are probably always going to be necessary, especially in the
case of young children. But according to Shapiro, we can do much bet
ter than we now do in providing children with democratic beginnings.
Parent-child hierarchies do not have to be prolonged forever, nor must
they pervade all aspects of a child's life. Instead, they can be kept to a
minimum and shaped according to the principle of democratic justice
to the extent that the only ones allowed to stay in place are those that
are
pertinent to their legitimate purposes [of care] . . . constrained to operate
in the interests of the children on whom they are imposed . . . designed to
prepare children to leave them in a timely fashion, and, where possible
. . . structured so as to reinforce - and certainly not to undermine democratic practices in the broader polity. [pp. 69-70]

While Shapiro's democratic principle of justice cannot eliminate all
of the hierarchical relationships of power in the lives of children, it can
go far in eliminating such relationships in the institution of marriage.
Here Shapiro focuses on patriarchal marriage and shows how virtually
all of its hierarchical aspects, including its asymmetrical nature, its
permanence, its insulation, and its nonvoluntary structure, are unnec
essary to the basic goals of intimacy and freedom associated with mar
riage and hence are in violation of the principle of democratic justice.
[P]atriarchal marriage runs afoul of every presumption against hierarchy
discussed above. It is evidently unnecessary, as demonstrated by the exis
tence of [many] alternatives . . . . Its hierarchy is asymmetrical: matriarchy
is not only not available, but frowned on in patriarchal cultures . . . . It
can be said to be chosen only in the highly constrained sense that people
can opt for it or not, often knowing that the latter choice will come at a
considerable economic and social price. [pp. 116-17]

How, though, can we institutionalize nonpatriarchal marriage?
How can we set up and legally enforce marriage contracts that are as
nonhierarchical as they can be given the values of both intimacy and
freedom? Shapiro rejects Susan Okin's proposal for mandating the
equal splitting of wages between husbands and wives9 on the grounds
9. SUSAN OK IN, JUSTIC E, GENDER, AND TH E FAMILY 139-169 (1989).
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that to do so interferes with the ability of individuals to design their
relationships according to their own particular needs, personalities,
and values. According to Shapiro, "[g]overnments do better . . . to en
able consenting adults to operate their own domestic arrangements in
ways that do not undermine the possibility of effective opposition" (p.
122).
But Shapiro does not jettison a role for the state in marriage alto
gether. Indeed, he insists on grounds of democratic justice that the
state enforce no-fault divorce laws and outlaw designer marriages and
prenuptial agreements that restrict the freedom of partners to exit the
marriage and to share in its benefits. Likewise, he insists that women
possess an absolute right to control their own reproductive functions;
otherwise they would not be free from the domination of male part
ners or the state, nor could they exercise their oppositional powers
against other oppressive practices in society.
Democratic justice in the workplace and marketplace is somewhat
more complicated as an issue than democratic justice in other spheres
of life, not only because the various.institutions associated with it are
so complex and causally related in complicated ways, but because the
question, "Is hierarchical relationship X, Y, or Z necessary to produc
tion or to the maintenance of the workplace itself?" is normally an
swered by participants in such relationships (managers and workers)
in a highly interested and partisan fashion. But, Shapiro argues, we can
nevertheless use the principle of democratic justice to render the insti
tutions of work, as well as those of the market, much more democratic
than they now are. How so?
Here again the task is to figure out how far we can go in eliminat
ing hierarchy and domination from, in this case, the workplace, with
out undermining the basic good that it supplies - namely, material
well-being for individuals and the community, as a whole. Among
other things, Shapiro argues, we can provide freedom for workers
from domination by managers by setting rules of termination on the
basis of statute, as in Norway, Sweden, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, or by developing a statute-bargaining hybrid such as that
which now prevails in Germany. In other words, we can use the state
to cut down on the power of managers in the realm of exit.
Shapiro acknowledges that the proper balance between statute and
bargaining in this context, as well as the particular rights that should
be ascribed to workers, will always be relative to the particular em
ployment patterns in place. But we can come up with a rule of thumb
for moving ourselves toward democratic justice in this arena:
The rule of thumb should be that the closer an actual society is to a
surfer's paradise, the lighter should be the quantum of proof that em
ployers must bear in employment litigation, but that the burden should
grow as society approaches a Dickensian nightmare. Such a rule would
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limit employers' freedom to take advantage of employees' necessity in
setting terms and conditions of employment . . . . [p. 184]

Shapiro extends this rule of thumb in extremely interesting and
useful ways into a whole host of employment and market mechanisms,
and he thereby illuminates the wide range of relationships that must
be balanced to keep hierarchy and domination to a minimum. Not
surprisingly, he confronts a fairly large number of questions of dis
tributive, as distinct from political, justice along the way, questions
that remind us that political justice and distributive justice are always
intertwined. While Shapiro acknowledges the interdependence of
these two kinds of justice when talking about work and the market, he
does not address the relationship between them directly. Instead, he
concentrates on showing that, contrary to conventional wisdom, ques
tions of distribution, such as those pertaining to one's access to goods
and services, are also questions of political justice by virtue of their ef
fects on one's relative power and vulnerability to the powers of others.
In the end, Shapiro manages to demonstrate, by his own example
as a normative political theorist who takes empirical social science se
riously, what a contextualized or pragmatic principle of justice should
be and what it should do for us. "A compelling conception of justice"
in these and all other contexts "should be flexible and context
sensitive . . . and remain faithful to their distinctive logics and pur
poses. . . . [It] must be sensitive to the contingencies of historical cir
cumstance" (p. 25).
Moreover, it should work within existing institutions in such a way
that these are able to effect a transition to democracy without sacri
ficing basic goods. "[D]emocratic justice is seldom about institutional
design; usually it is about institutional redesign. We are born into on
going complexes of institutions and practices. The task is to democra
tize them as we reproduce them, not to design them anew" (p. 26).
How compelling is Shapiro's own democratic conception of jus
tice? What can we do with it? Who is obliged to accept it? Shapiro
claims at the outset that his conception of democratic justice should be
accepted by everyone, since democracy is now implicated in justice "valued by those who care about justice" (p. 19) - and since democ
racy is, from Shapiro's perspective, necessary to the ordering of any
sphere of life. "[D]issensus is an essential ingredient to the just order
ing of any domain of human interaction" (p. 14).
I suspect that Shapiro is right here that "democracy offers the most
attractive political basis for ordering social relations justly" (p. 5) and that many of our realms of human interaction would be more pro
ductive if they were organized democratically. But he can only claim
that democracy is attractive to all as a basis of political justice if every
one values democracy. And he can only claim that democracy is neces
sary to the organization of all forms of human interaction if he can
show this to be true in all spheres of life, including those, such as the
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military, where many now find that dissensus hinders the realization of
the basic goods supposedly promoted in these spheres.
Neither of these points challenges the substance of Shapiro's
democratic principle of justice itself. Nor does it suggest that a concep
tion of justice that is democratic is not attractive. (Indeed, I suspect
that democrats of all kinds will find Shapiro's principle of justice very
attractive.) But it does suggest that its attractiveness presupposes the
attractiveness of democracy itself as a set of ideals. Hence, those who
do not find democratic ideals attractive, or who would prefer to
ground justice in other political values, are not obliged to accept the
privileged place that Shapiro gives to democracy in justice (unless, of
course, Shapiro can show that dissensus really does enhance all
spheres of human interaction).
But once we state the project as articulating the best possible way
to bring justice and democracy together, a project description that
Shapiro himself employs in different parts of the book, his conception
of democratic justice becomes very compelling, as well as very impor
tant, for three basic reasons. First, it does something that other politi
cal theories of justice should, but generally do not now do: it focuses
attention on the justice of power relationships, as distinct from the jus
tice of material distributions of wealth. In other words, it develops a
distinctly political, rather than economic or moral, principle of justice,
and it does so at a very high level of analysis.
Second, it shows what this principle of justice looks like in detail
within particular institutions, both public and private, on the basis of a
great deal of detailed knowledge about these institutions (and with a
healthy sense that private domination is also political). Hence, it is not,
like many conceptions of justice, overly abstract or incapable of being
manifest in particular institutions without losing its standing as justice.
Instead, it allows us to talk about justice in many different spheres of
life on the basis of the rules according to which these spheres are
themselves governed and with an eye to the empirical conditions un
der which justice itself will be manifest.
Finally, like Teitel's model of transitional justice, it forces us to ac
knowledge that justice as part of democracy is not a stagnant ideal or a
set of standards that are to be imposed on democratic movements
from above, but is instead a set of rule-based arrangements that evolve
over time, that are never perfect, and that require constant reworking
under new conditions. Not surprisingly, such arrangements are messy
and in constant tension with other demands of democratization. But,
as both Shapiro and Teitel show very elegantly, and with great success,
any notion of justice that hopes to explain or argue normatively about
justice in transitional periods of democratization must incorporate
such contingencies into itself and be constantly open to their revision.

